Lifetime Labor Supply in a Search Model of Unemployment by Bettendorf, L.J.H. (Leon) & Broer, D.P. (Peter)

	


			

   
	




 
 
	



	
 
	

 

	!
"	
#$"%

$&%'


 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-
scientific nature to driessen@tinbergen.nl. 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
Lifetime Labor Supply in a Search Model of Unemployment
Leon J.H. Bettendorf, D. Peter Broer∗
OCFEB, Erasmus University Rotterdam
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague
March 31, 2003
Abstract
This paper investigates the age-dependency of participation and unemployment by integrating
job search with intertemporal optimizing behavior of finitely-lived households. We find that
search frictions and tax rates distort the decisions of older workers to a much larger extent than
that of young workers. This finding provides an explanation of the observed fall of partici-
pation rates of elder workers as a result of the post-war increase in tax rates and replacement
rates. We show that the age pattern of search unemployment does not match observed unem-
ployment and we propose a new concept of ‘voluntary’ unemployment that agrees well with
observations.
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1 Introduction
The decline in labor force participation of the elderly is one of the most striking developments
of post-war labor markets. The participation ratio has declined strongly in virtually all developed
countries over the past few decades. The survey of Gruber and Wise (1997) shows that partici-
pation rates for persons in the age bracket 60-64 have fallen by more than half in most countries.
This participation rate is now less than 20% in the Netherlands, and around 50% in the U.S. This
trend stands in sharp contrast to the increase in the overall participation in most countries in the
nineties and it suggests that participation rate of the elderly may be affected differently by eco-
nomic conditions than participation of prime-aged households.
This paper investigates the relation between social insurance, taxes, and labor market partic-
ipation of elder workers from a life cycle perspective. We explore the interaction between firms
and households on the labor market to explain the relation between participation, unemployment,
and age. The focus of the paper is on the distortions created by the tax system and social security
provisions with respect to participation rates over the life time of a household. To capture the age-
dependency of labor market participation, the paper links the life cycle model of labor supply and
consumption with an imperfect labor market in which search costs create a surplus value for a job
match which is divided by wage bargaining. The paper thus integrates life-cycle models of labor
supply (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)) and the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) matching model
of wage formation and unemployment (Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a)).
In the paper the age dependency of the job value plays a central role in the explanation of
the development of participation rates over the life cycle. For a household, the job value is the
marginal utility of a job in consumption units. The job value therefore determines the return to
search and the search effort. In the MP model, the job value equals the difference between the
value of employment and the value of unemployment. Here we use the more general definition
introduced by Shi and Wen (1997), which is defined in terms of the marginal utility of leisure.
With finite lives, the job value must eventually fall to zero, at the point in time where the
household exits the labor market. This decline of the job value during the later stages of a house-
hold’s active life forms a key element in our explanation of the observed fall in participation rates.
First, a low job value implies a low return to search and a low search effort. Low search intensities
imply falling participation rates, as the job creation rate falls below the job destruction rate. This
implies that the expected exit date from the labor force affects labor participation several years
before. Second, taxes and social insurance shorten the time remaining until the job value falls
to zero, as they lower the net return to work. Forward-looking behavior implies that taxes and
social insurance have a particularly large impact on the participation of elder workers. Low search
intensities of elder households generate participation rates that increasingly fall behind the partic-
ipation profile that would result in the absence of distortions. Labor taxes and social insurance
therefore create a dynamic distortion, in the same way as capital income taxation, because they
affect an investment decision, the search effort. We show that the distortionary impact of taxes and
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replacement rates affects in particular labor market participation of elder workers.
The age structure of unemployment also depends on the development of the job value. The
decline of job value in the later stages of the life of a household implies that search unemployment
of older workers is close to zero in the years preceding labor market exit. This implication of
search models does not agree with observed unemployment rates by age. We argue that search
models can be reconciled with the observed evidence by modeling unemployment in the same
terms in which it is measured. By defining unemployment as the extra amount that people would
be willing to work at the going wage rate if a job were offered to them (i.e. without requiring
search effort), we show that the model predicts that unemployment actually rises in the years prior
to labor market exit. This feature of the model corresponds well with observed age-unemployment
statistics.
Another implication of our model is that the relation between wages and productivity varies
by age. Positive job values indicate a surplus value of a match. This surplus is divided between
employer and worker in proportion to their bargaining power. For middle-aged workers, this
implies that the wage is below their marginal product. However, if the value of a job is low, there
is little surplus to be divided, and the wage outcome is near the marginal productivity of a worker.
Since the value of a job must decline as the worker approaches voluntary retirement, workers that
are near voluntary retirement receive approximately their marginal product.
In the literature on labor market search, the effects of heterogeneity by age have received scant
attention. The standard model of search unemployment (Pissarides (1990)) does not explicitly
integrate job search with intertemporal optimizing behavior of households. The reservation wage
equals the return to permanent income in unemployment. Merz (1995) extends the basic model
to an intertemporal context to addresses RBC issues. This introduces an explicit relation between
the reservation wage and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Heer
(1997), Atkinson (1999), and Shi and Wen (1999) apply the model to study the effects of social
insurance on employment and welfare.
Models of search unemployment with heterogeneous households are less common. Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999b) consider the effects of household heterogeneity by skill level, assuming that
labor markets are segmented by skill level. They find that a high level of social insurance affects
labor participation of low-skilled households relatively more than that of high-skilled households.
The fundamental reason is that both types value leisure equally, whereas the opportunity costs of
leisure are lower for low-skilled households. In this paper, we do not assume that the marginal
value of leisure is constant among different households. Instead, we distinguish households by
age. Bhattacharya et al. (2001) and Shimer and Smith (2001) look at the optimal level of social
security in a model with old and young workers. They find that public pensions can serve to
compensate for a search externality, by inducing old workers to search less. In comparison with
these papers, we do not focus on welfare issues but we look at the effects of social insurance on
labor participation in a fully developed life cycle model.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is expounded in Section 2.
Section 2.1 discusses the matching model and Section 2.2 discusses the implications of household
heterogeneity by age from the side of the firm. Section 2.3 describes labor supply and search de-
cisions for an individual household, and Section 3 discusses the implications for wage formation.
Section 4 uses these results to analyze the optimal pattern of labor supply and job search over
the life cycle of a household, using a specific parameterization of the utility function. Section 5
investigates the link between search costs, labor taxes, and unemployment. The results of Sections
4 and 5 are checked for the general case by numerical simulation in Section 6. Section 7 offers
some conclusions.
2 The Model
The labor market is characterized by transactions costs through a search externality. Search takes
time and the probability of a match depends on the search effort of the other market party as well.
Jobs are infinitely divisible, so that the labor market may be interpreted as a market for hours of
work. Jobs are destructed if their value drops to zero. In addition, jobs disappear at an exogenous
rate as a result of unspecified turbulence.
Firms hire workers by posting vacancies. For a firm, the value of a match is determined by the
present value of the difference between the marginal product of a worker and his wage. Because
capital is mobile, the marginal product of a worker depends only on the exogenous interest rate
and an age component. The present value is also affected by the expected duration of the match.
Workers of different ages have different values for the firm.
Households have finite lives. Productivity is age-related and eventually falls with age. House-
holds choose optimal paths of leisure and consumption over their lifetime. To obtain employment,
a household must search for jobs. Search time does not generate utility. All exit options are
regarded as equivalent, so that all forms of non-participation receive the same, age-dependent,
benefit. For households, there are no job setup costs so the income risk of unemployment can be
covered through self-insurance by holding many small jobs.1
Job values for households are defined as the value of the utility gain in consumption units
of a marginally larger job. Job values depend positively on current and future wage rates and
negatively on current and future benefits, on interest rates and on separation rates. The return to
search consists of the value of a job times the matching rate per unit of search. If the return to
search is lower than the marginal utility of leisure, a household stops searching for new jobs. A
separation occurs if the value of a job drops to zero.
1Alternatively, and equivalently, it may be assumed that the unemployment risk is insured through income pooling
within an extended family with an infinite number of members. See e.g. Merz (1995).
3
2.1 Labor Market Flows
Let U denote the effective number of job seekers and V the number of vacancies. The number of
contacts between job seekers and vacancies is given by the matching function
M = x(U,V ) (1)
Equation (1) describes the number of job matches in the labor market. It is assumed that x is
homogeneous of degree one. Denote the aggregate vacancy-job seeker ratio by θ , θ =V/U . The
contact rate per vacancy is now M/V = x(θ−1,1). This contact rate is beyond the control of the
individual firm.
It is assumed that the probability of a contact between a worker of a specific age and a firm
is independent of age and depends only on the aggregate contact rate and the proportion of job-
seeking workers of that age. Let the proportion of job-seeking workers of generation t0 at time t
be denoted by u¯(t, t0) =U(t, t0)/U(t), then the inflow rate into employment of generation t0 is
m(t, t0) =
M(t, t0)
V (t)
= x(θ−1(t),1) u¯(t, t0) (2)
Denote the separation rate of workers of generation t0 by s(t, t0), then the change in employ-
ment per generation is
˙N(t, t0) = m(t, t0)V (t)− s(t, t0)N(t, t0) (3)
where N(t, t0) denotes the work force by generation.
2.2 Firms
The state vector for an individual firm i at t contains the employment vector Ni(t, t0) and the capital
stock Ki(t). It is assumed that depreciation is exponential, so that
˙Ki(t) = Ii(t)−δKi(t) (4)
where δ the deterioration rate of capital. The employment equation is analogous to (3),
˙Ni(t, t0) = m(t, t0)Vi(t)− s(t, t0)Ni(t, t0) (5)
It is assumed that a firm can freely dismiss workers. This implies that it can choose the separation
rate s, subject to an exogenous quit rate: s(t, t0) ≥ q¯(t, t0). The production function is F [Ki,Ni],
where
Ni(t) =
∫ t
−∞
h(t− τ)Ni(t,τ)dτ
where h(τ) gives the productivity index of a worker of age τ . This specification posits that work-
ers of different age groups are perfectly substitutable in production. The market value Πi of an
individual firm is determined by the arbitrage condition
r(t)Πi(t) = F [Ki(t),Ni(t)]−
∫ t
−∞
w(t,τ)Ni(t,τ)dτ− γ0(t)Vi(t)− pI(t)Ii(t)+ ˙Πi(t) (6)
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where w is the wage rate and γ0 denotes the cost of opening a vacancy.
The marginal productivity relation for capital satisfies the standard condition
FK [Ki(t),Ni(t)] = pI(t)
(
r(t)+δ − p˙I(t)
pI(t)
)
(7)
Since the hiring of workers is subject to transaction costs, workers, like capital, are an asset to the
firm. The asset value φN of a worker is given by the following arbitrage relation
r(t)φNi(t, t0) =
˙φNi(t, t0)+FN [Ki(t),Ni(t)]h(t− t0)−w(t, t0)− s(t, t0)φNi(t, t0) (8)
The return to hiring a new worker, rφN , must equal the capital gain, ˙φN , plus the increase in pro-
duction and minus the extra wage costs and the depreciation of the work force due to separations.
A voluntary separation occurs at a point T (t0) where φNi(T, t0) = 0, FN h(T − t0)−w(T, t0) = 0,
and ˙φN < 0. That is, the labor contract ends if and when the asset value of the worker turns nega-
tive (the dismissal condition).2 Because of the transactions costs of hiring workers, the wage is not
in general equal to the marginal product of a worker. (8) suggests that the marginal productivity
of labor may be either higher or lower than the wage rate, depending on the user cost of workers
(net of wage costs), φN
(
r+ s− ˙φN/φN
)
.
Vacancies are not age-specific, because the return to a worker of any age is nonnegative, due
to the age-specificity of wages.3 Opening of a vacancy therefore results in job applicants of all
ages. The total value of the resulting matches must equal the cost of opening the vacancy:∫ t
−∞
φNi(t,τ)m(t,τ)dτ = γ0(t) (9)
(9) is a generalization of the free-entry condition for unfilled jobs in Pissarides (1990). It is more
general in that the return to opening a vacancy depends on the age composition of the job applicants
and the effect of age on the value of a worker.
2.3 Households
Household maximize their lifetime utility over consumption and leisure, subject to a time con-
straint, a budget constraint, and a transactions constraint on the labor market. Time is divided
between working n, leisure l, and job search u:
u(t, t0)+n(t, t0)+ l(t, t0) = 1 (10)
where t is the time index and t0 denotes the generation index of the household. u(t, t0) is equal to
the time spent searching for jobs and does not directly generate utility. It is assumed that on-the-
job search is impossible. u may therefore be interpreted as search unemployment. The transactions
2If φN = 0 and ˙φN = 0, continuation of the job does not affect the market value of firm.
3The determination of wages is discussed in Section 3.
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technology on the labor market is given by (1). Households initially enter the labor market without
a job, n(t0, t0) = 0. For the individual household, the inflow into employment is
n˙(t, t0) = χ(t)u(t, t0)−q(t, t0)n(t, t0) (11)
where χ(t) = M(t, t0)/U(t, t0) = θ(t)x(θ−1(t),1) is the matching rate for job searchers. Note
that the matching rate per hour of search is the same for all generations, because the matching
technology (1) does not depend on age. The separation rate q(t, t0) is bounded below by the
exogenous job destruction rate q¯(t, t0), i.e. q(t, t0) ≥ q¯(t, t0).4 Voluntary quits occur if q > q¯. An
individual household may reduce its employment suddenly by a finite amount by choosing an
unbounded quit rate.
Households face two kinds of uncertainty, that are both fully diversified. The first is the income
uncertainty associated with variations in employment level. In the absence of indivisibilities, a
household can self-insure against job loss by filling several jobs, each for a small fraction of the
available time.5 With an infinite amount of infinitesimal jobs per household, this reduces income
uncertainty to zero. The second source of uncertainty is the death hazard. It is assumed that
this uncertainty is diversified by letting each household receive an annuity from a life insurance
company in return for bequeathing it its remaining assets upon its decease (Yaari (1965)). Let
Λ(τ) denote the survival probability of a new-born household till age τ . Then the mortality rate is
µ(t, t0) =− ˙Λ(t− t0)/Λ(t− t0), and the annuity is µ(t, t0)a(t, t0).
The budget constraint of a member of generation t0 is
a˙(t, t0) = (r(t)+µ(t, t0))a(t, t0)+w(t, t0)n(t, t0)−T (w(t, t0)n(t, t0)) (12)
+piu
(
t, t0
)
u(t, t0)+ z(t, t0)
(
1−n(t, t0))− (1+ τc(t))c(t, t0)
z(t, t0) = b(t, t0)w(t, t0) (13)
where a(t, t0) denotes the asset holdings of a member of generation t0, with a(t0, t0)= 0, T
(
w(t, t0)n(t, t0)
)
is the tax schedule for labor income, τc denotes the consumption tax, z(t, t0) is the (age-dependent)
unemployment benefit rate, and b(t, t0) is the replacement rate. The unemployment benefit is based
on wage income of the average worker of a given age. It is therefore out of control for the indi-
vidual worker.6 piu denotes the search premium on job search of the social security agency.7 Note
4Note that the separation rate q for the individual household is different from the separation rate for the firm, s, on
account of population dynamics, see Section 3, eq. (22).
5Self-employed people, with many customers, and consultants in business firms are common examples of this type
of insurance. Alternatively, it may be assumed that households of the same age, who face the same unemployment risk,
are engaged in income pooling. Of course, this assumption generates a moral hazard problem unless the households
can be regarded as members of an extended family.
6This assumption reflects the rules pertaining to welfare benefits in the Netherlands. Unemployment insurance is
typically linked to the current wage level, if with a maximum, and only for a finite amount of time.
7Equivalently, w(t, t0)b(t, t0) + piu(t) may be interpreted as the unemployment benefit, in which case piu(t) is a
penalty for not searching.
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that the observed number of matches in (11) may provide the information needed by the social
security agency to identify u(t, t0) separately from leisure. This information is used in (12), where
it is assumed that the social security agency can monitor the time spent searching.
The utility functional is
ϒ(t, t0) =
1
1−1/γ
∫ t0+T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Λ(τ− t0)
Λ(t− t0)
υ
(
c(τ, t0), l(τ, t0)
)1−1/γ dτ (14)
where T denotes the maximum life of a household, defined by T = inf{τ | Λ(τ) = 0}. It is
assumed that T < ∞. The decision problem of the household extends the standard life cycle
consumption-saving framework in that there is a second investment margin present. A household
has to decide whether to sacrifice leisure by searching for jobs. The return to this investment con-
tains an age-specific component, both because of finite lives and because of the relation between
age and productivity that is present in the wage profile w(t, t0). As the household grows older, it
will generally enter into a disinvestment phase by reducing its work effort and search intensity. In
this respect the problem is similar to the human capital accumulation problem. A difference is that
search generates jobs, whereas schooling generates a higher return to jobs (for a survey of human
capital models, see Weiss (1986)).
2.3.1 Job Value and Labor Supply
The household maximizes utility (14) subject to the employment constraint (11), the budget con-
straint (12), and restrictions on the use of time in (10). The savings-consumption decision is
described by the Keynes-Ramsey rule
˙λa(τ, t0) =−λa(τ, t0)(r(τ)+µ(τ, t0)) (15a)
λa(τ, t0) = e
−ρ(τ−t) Λ(τ− t0)
Λ(t− t0)
υ(τ, t0)
−1/γ υc(c(τ, t0), l(τ, t0))
1+ τc(τ)
(15b)
where λa = ∂ϒ∂a is the marginal utility of financial wealth.
To discuss the allocation of time it is useful to introduce the job value pn, defined by
pn(t, t0) =
∂ϒ(t, t0)
∂n(t, t0)
/
∂ϒ(t, t0)
∂a(t, t0)
The job value gives the marginal utility of a job, measured in terms of the marginal utility of
wealth. The job value satisfies the following arbitrage equation
w(τ, t0)
[
1−T ′ (w(τ, t0)n(τ, t0))]+ p˙n(τ, t0)−q(τ, t0)pn(τ, t0)+λn(τ, t0)
= (1+ τc(τ))
υl(t, t0)
υc(t, t0)
+ z
(
τ, t0
)
+
(
r(τ)+µ(τ, t0)
)
pn(τ, t0) (16)
where the time derivative is wrt. τ . This equation compares the return to a job on the left-hand side
with the alternate return of leisure, (1+ τc)υl/υc+z, plus the return on tangible assets, (r+µ) pn,
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on the right-hand side. λn is a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the nonnegativity constraint on employ-
ment (n ≥ 0). All use of time is necessarily nonnegative, and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
given by
λu(τ, t0)u(τ, t0) = 0 (17a)
λn(τ, t0)n(τ, t0) = 0 (17b)
λl(τ, t0)l(τ, t0) = 0 (17c)
The possible combinations of the values of these multipliers determine the phases of the life cy-
cle of the household, as summarized in Proposition 1 below. We shall assume a priori that the
curvature of the utility function ensures that l > 0, so that λl = 0 identically.
Time allocation decisions are described by
υl(c(τ, t0), l(τ, t0))
υc(c(τ, t0), l(τ, t0))
=
(
χ(τ)pn(τ, t0)+piu(τ, t0)+λu(τ, t0)
)
/(1+ τc(τ)) (18a)
λq(τ, t0) = pn(τ, t0)n(τ, t0) (18b)
0 = λq(τ, t0)
(
q(τ, t0)− q¯(τ, t0)
) (18c)
(18a) compares the marginal utility of leisure with that of financial wealth. If the household
is actively searching, λu = 0 so that the opportunity costs of leisure equal the return to search.
However, if the return to search is sufficiently low, the household may stop searching for a job and
the marginal value of leisure exceeds the return on the labor market. Note that this case does not
arise in the Pissarides (1990) model, as it cannot be an equilibrium with a single representative
household. With heterogeneity by age the link between value of leisure and returns on the labor
market may be cut for part of the life of a household. (18b) demands that voluntary quits are zero
if the job value is positive, where (18c) represents the complementary slackness condition of the
job separation restriction q(t, t0)≥ q¯(t, t0).
It is proved in Appendix C that the decisions of the household can be classified as belonging
to one of four phases, depending on the possible combinations of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers:
Proposition 1 Let piu < (1−b−T ′)w. Then labor supply behavior of a household falls in one of
four different stages
1. Searching for new jobs. The marginal value of jobs is positive (pn > 0, λu = 0, λq > 0,
λn = 0)
2. Employed, not searching for new jobs, but not voluntarily quitting either. The marginal job
value is positive (pn > 0, λu > 0, λq > 0, λn = 0)
3. Lowering its participation at a pace greater than the job destruction rate. The marginal job
value is zero (pn = 0, λu > 0, λq = 0, λn = 0)
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4. Retired or without a job and not searching. The job value is zero (pn = 0, λu > 0, λq = 0,
λn > 0)
Stage 1 generally corresponds to the period in which the household is young and its prospects
on the labor market are improving. This case is characterized by active searching for new job
opportunities, i.e. u(t, t0) > 0 and no voluntary quits q(t, t0) = q¯(t, t0). By (18b), this implies a
positive job value over time, pn(t, t0) > 0. Eventually, the job value will start to decline, both on
account of the finite horizon of the household and on account of the declining labor productivity,
and we enter the second stage.
Stage 1 is the only case considered in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides job search model. To
see that the formulation of the standard model is equivalent to the one used in the present paper,
combine (18a) and (16) to obtain the dynamic job value equation for actively searching households
p˙n(τ, t0)+w(τ, t0)
[
1−T ′ (w(τ, t0)n(τ, t0))] (19)
= z
(
τ, t0
)
+piu(τ, t0)+
(
r(τ)+µ(τ, t0)+χ(τ)+q(τ, t0)
)
pn(τ, t0)
This equation is equivalent to (3.23) in Pissarides (1990), with pn corresponding to E −U . How-
ever, (19) is not valid if the household does not search, but still attaches a positive value to the jobs
that it fills.
Stage 2 corresponds to a situation in which the value of a job is still positive, pn(t, t0) > 0,
but too low to induce the household to look for new jobs, i.e. u(t, t0) = 0. It follows from (18b)
and (18c) that q(t, t0) = q¯(t, t0), i.e. no voluntary quits. Hence the change in labor supply of the
household is given by (11) as n˙(t, t0) = −q¯(t, t0)n(t, t0). In this stage, the opportunity costs of
search are larger than the expected benefits, so that (19) does not hold (but (16) does). This may
happen e.g. because the outflow rate χ from unemployment is small (a discouraged worker effect),
or because the value of a job is small, either as a result of a high replacement rate, or in view of
the approaching retirement date.
Stage 3 is characterized by zero search (u = 0) and voluntary reductions in labor participation
(q > q¯). This case ensues once the household wants to reduce its work effort at a faster pace than
is compatible with the exogenous job destruction rate q¯. During this phase
υl(t, t0)
υc(t, t0)
=
(
w(τ, t0)
[
1−T ′ (w(τ, t0)n(τ, t0))]− z(τ, t0))/(1+ τc(τ)) (20)
so that with voluntary quitting, the opportunity costs of leisure equal the net after-tax wage rate.
During this phase household labor supply therefore conforms to the classical static labor supply
schedule.
The development of the job value over the working life of a household can be written in terms
of the discounted value of the future gains from employment. DenoteTh(t, t0)=
{
τ ≥ t | λn(τ, t0) = 0
}
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and integrate (16) to obtain
pn(t, t0) =
∫
Th(t,t0)
(
w(τ, t0)
[
1−T ′ (w(τ, t0)n(τ, t0))]− z(τ, t0)− (1+ τc(τ)) υl(τ, t0)υc(τ, t0)
)
· exp
[
−
∫ τ
t
(q(u, t0)+ r(u)+µ(u, t0))du
]
dτ (21)
This equation holds irrespective of whether the household searches or quits. In the integrand
z+(1+ τc)υl/υc defines the fall-back position of the household in terms of the alternate income
from unemployment plus the monetary value of leisure. Marginal labor income is discounted at the
applicable interest rate for households of generation t0, plus the labor market turnover rate q. Note
that the job value depends on the marginal labor tax rate, because bargaining is effectively over
hours. In contrast to static models of the labor market, the net wage does not necessarily exceed
the fall-back position of households in all periods. Note however that it follows from (16) that if
the integrand is negative at time τ ∈ Th, the job value must be increasing at time τ . Intuitively, a
low current wage may be compensated for by high expected future wages.
The final phase is retirement from the labor force, characterized by l(t, t0) = 1, u(t, t0) = 0,
and n(t, t0) = 0. The job value is zero as well, so that (16) results in
υl(t, t0)
υc(t, t0)
>
(
w(τ, t0)
[
1−T ′ (w(τ, t0)n(τ, t0))]− z(τ, t0))/(1+ τc(τ))
These four stages exhaust the possible optimal choices of the household. What remains open is
whether they occur in the particular order in which they have been presented. Outside the steady
state, this is not necessarily the case. A household may decide to temporarily stop looking for
jobs if the prospect of finding new ones is particularly bad during a recession, or it may wish to
temporarily withdraw from the labor market if (after-tax) wages are particularly low.
3 Wage Formation
Labor market equilibrium requires that supply and demand balance for workers of each generation
N(t, t0) = n(t, t0)gen(t0)Λ(t− t0)
where gen(t0) denotes the initial size of generation t0. Hence, ˙N/N = n˙/n−µ . This implies that
the market separation rate equals the individual separation rate plus the mortality rate
s(t, t0) = q(t, t0)+µ(t, t0) (22)
It is assumed that the market clearing wage is set by bargaining between job seekers and firms
to divide the surplus value of the match. The value of a match for the firm is given by φN(t, t0)
in (8), and for the worker by pn(t, t0) in (16). We assume that commitment over future wages is
impossible, so that implicit contracts, as in Lazear (1979), cannot occur. The subgame perfect
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Nash solution therefore satisfies w(t, t0) = arg max
w(t,t0)
pn(t, t0)
ωφN(t, t0)
1−ω
, where 0 < ω < 1 is the
relative bargaining strength of the household. Using the expressions for the job values (8) and
(16), the Nash solution results in the well-known sharing rule[
1− εT T ′
]
ω φN(t, t0) = (1−ω) pn(t, t0) (23)
where εT is defined in terms of the elasticity of the marginal tax function, εT = 1+ xT ′′(x)/T ′(x).
Note that εT = 1 iff the marginal labor tax is independent of income.
For a linear tax system (23) yields
w(t, t0) = ωFN(t)h
(
t− t0
)
+
1−ω
1−T ′
[
(1+ τc(t))
υl(t, t0)
υc(t, t0)
+b(t, t0)w(t, t0)
]
(24)
(24) shows that the wage outcome rises with productivity FNh, the replacement ratio b, the marginal
tax T ′, consumption taxes τc, and the value of leisure υl/υc. If the household is actively searching,
(18a) shows that the wage equals
w(t, t0) = ωFN(t)h
(
t− t0
)
+
1−ω
1−T ′
[
χ pn(t, t0)+piu(t, t0)+b(t, t0)w(t, t0)
] (25)
The fall-back position of the household consists of the return to search, χ pn +piu, plus the unem-
ployment benefit. If the household is quitting voluntarily (q(t, t0)> q¯(t, t0)), using (20) shows that
w(t, t0) = FN(t)h
(
t− t0
) (26)
That is, if a household is reducing its work effort, and therefore attaches zero value to a job, the
wage outcome for its remaining employment equals its marginal productivity. We summarize
these findings in
Proposition 2 Let the wage tax be a linear function of wage income. Then the wage rate follows
from (24). For actively searching households this is equivalent to (25) and for households with a
zero job value the wage equals the marginal productivity as given in (26).
4 Labor Supply and Unemployment over the Life Cycle
In this section we study the time profile of labor supply and search effort over the life cycle of an
individual household. The time profiles of both consumption and leisure depend to a large extent
on the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) for leisure and for consumption.
There is substantial uncertainty about the size of the IES for consumption (see Browning et al.
(1999), table 3.1 and 3.2), but the generally accepted view is that it is non-negligible. As for
leisure, there is a fair amount of controversy on the empirical relevance of intertemporal substi-
tution for labor supply behavior. The established view, as represented in the surveys of Pencavel
(1986) and Card (1994), is that the IES for leisure is small and possibly zero. More recently,
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counter evidence has been found, see Blundell et al. (1993) and Mulligan (1998), so the issue is
still unsettled.
We specifically investigate the implications of a zero IES for the supply of labor over the life
cycle. The assumption of a zero IES implies that labor supply is not affected by the level of
consumption or the level of financial wealth, but depends solely on the (expected) return to labor
and job search. This is somewhat restrictive, but the neglect of income effects does allow for an
analytic treatment of the problem, so it may be regarded as a useful first step. In addition, we
assume that households have a fixed life, so that the death hazard is zero until the full life span
has passed. The tax function is assumed to be linear, and the job destruction rate q¯ and match
rate χ are constant. In addition, it is assumed that unemployment benefits b and search subsidies
piu are independent of age. The only remaining age dependency is this section is therefore the
productivity of the household, h(τ). In Section 6 we shall extend our insights to the general case
by means of numerical simulation.
4.1 Labor Supply
Mankiw et al. (1985) consider a class of utility functions that includes different degrees of substi-
tution for consumption and leisure. If in (14) the flow utility function is of the form8
υ(c, l) = c+α1/α10 l
1−1/α1/(1−1/α1) (27)
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure is zero. Using this specification, the first-order
conditions can be simplified considerably. Using the job value notation we find as a special case
of (15b) and (18a)
e−ρ(τ−t)υ(τ)−1/γ = λa(τ)(1+ τc) (28)
α1/α10 l (τ)
−1/α1 = (χ pn(τ)+piu +λu(τ))/(1+ τc) (29)
Note that the labor supply and search decisions are effectively independent of the marginal utility
of wealth, λa. This implies that the decisions are recursive: first the life cycle path of labor supply
is determined and then consumption. Using this separation property, we first investigate the life
cycle path of employment and job search. To simplify the analysis, it will be assumed that the
tax function is linear in labor income, so that the marginal tax does not vary over the life cycle.
Proposition 1 above distinguishes four different stages within the life cycle, that yield the follow-
ing equations for the special case under consideration
Stage 1 (search unemployment)
This regime holds if for given n(τ)> 0 and pn(τ)> 0, the optimal leisure choice in (31c) does not
violate the time constraint, i.e. if
α0 ((χ pn(τ)+piu)/(1+ τc))
−α1 < 1−n(τ) (30)
8In this section the time index refers only to age. We assume that all tax rates and contribution rates are constant.
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Because the marginal job has a surplus value for both the employee and the employer, the wage
bargain results in a division of the marginal value of (labor) time for the employer and the marginal
value of (search) time for the household.
n˙(τ) =−q¯n(τ)+χ u(τ) (31a)
p˙n(τ) =−
(
1−T ′−b) w(τ)+piu +(q¯+χ+ r) pn(τ) (31b)
l(τ) = α0
(
χ pn(τ)+piu
1+ τc
)−α1
(31c)
u(τ) = 1−n(τ)− l(τ)≥ 0 (31d)
w(τ) =
[
ωFNh(τ)+
1−ω
1−T ′ (χ pn(τ)+piu)
]
/
(
1− (1−ω) b
1−T ′
)
(31e)
Substituting from (31c)-(31e), the differential equation system is therefore
n˙(τ) =−(q¯ +χ)n(τ)+χ
(
1−α0
(
χ pn(τ)+piu
1+ τc
)−α1)
(32)
p˙n(τ) =− ω (1−T
′)
1−T ′− (1−ω)b
((
1−T ′−b)FNh(τ) −piu)
+
(
q¯+ r+
ω (1−T ′) χ
1−T ′− (1−ω)b
)
pn(τ) (33)
This differential equation system is non-autonomous. It has constant coefficients, but the first term
in the p˙n equation is time-dependent on account of the age dependency of the productivity of the
household. Note that the p˙n = 0 line is a straight line in the (n, pn) plane:
pn(τ) =
ω (1−T ′)
1−T ′− (1−ω)b
(1−T ′−b)FN h(τ)−piu
q¯+ r+ ω (1−T
′)χ
1−T ′−(1−ω)b
(34)
The p˙n = 0 line shifts up with the productivity of the household. The n˙ = 0 line is given by
n =
χ
χ+ q¯
(
1−α0
(
χ pn +piu
1+ τc
)−α1)
(35)
Comparing (35) with (30), we see that all points (n, pn) on the n˙ = 0 curve satisfy u > 0. In addi-
tion, the n˙ = 0 line is increasing and concave in pn.
Stage 2 (zero search)
This regime applies if, for given n(τ) and pn(τ), the solution to (31c) yields a violation of the time
constraint (31d). The set of periods for which the household is in Phase 2 is therefore given by{
τ
∣∣∣∣∣n(τ)+α0
(
χ pn(τ)+piu
1+ τc
)−α1
> 1 , pn(τ)> 0
}
(36)
If the household has stopped searching, employment falls at the exogenous separation rate q¯. The
employment level determines leisure via (37c). The value of time for the household is now larger
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than the marginal revenue of search, so that the bargained wage explicitly depends on the marginal
utility of leisure (37e).
n˙(τ) =−q¯n(τ) (37a)
p˙n(τ) =−
(
1−T ′−b) w(τ)+(1+ τc)(1−n(τ)α0
)−1/α1
+(q¯+ r) pn(τ) (37b)
l(τ) = 1−n(τ) (37c)
u(τ) = 0 (37d)
w(τ) =
[
ωFNh(τ)+(1−ω)
1+ τc
1−T ′
[
1−n(τ)
α0
]−1/α1]
/
(
1− (1−ω) b
1−T ′
)
(37e)
Note that the n˙ = 0 line coincides with the pn-axis. The differential equation for pn is given by
p˙n(τ) =− (1−T
′−b)
1−T ′− (1−ω)b ω
(
1−T ′)FNh(τ)+(q¯+ r) pn(τ) (38)
+
ω (1−T ′)(1+ τc)
1−T ′− (1−ω)b
[
1−n(τ)
α0
]−1/α1
The p˙n = 0 line for this stage may therefore be written as
pn = ω
(
1−T ′) (1−T ′−b)FN h(τ)− (1+ τc)
(
1−n
α0
)−1/α1
(1−T ′− (1−ω)b) (q¯+ r) (39)
This equation is decreasing and concave in n.
Stage 3 (quitting)
This phase arises when the household attaches zero value to a marginal job (pn = 0), so that
voluntary quits may occur (q> q¯). Proposition 1 states that in this case job search is zero, u(τ) = 0
and λu(τ)> 0. Applying Proposition 2 now yields w(τ) = FNh(τ). That is, as the opportunity cost
of leisure is just the net wage, the optimal amount of labor supply is determined by the classical
labor supply schedule.
n˙(τ) =−q(τ)n(τ) (40a)
pn(τ) = 0 (40b)
l(τ) = α0
[
1−T ′−b
1+ τc
w(τ)
]−α1
(40c)
n(τ) = 1− l(τ) (40d)
w(τ) = FNh(τ) (40e)
Since n˙(τ)/n(τ) ≤ −q¯(τ) during this stage, it follows from (40d) and (40e) that ˙h(τ)/h(τ) ≤
−q¯(τ)/α1 · n(τ)/l(τ). That is, quitting is more likely to occur when the participation rate is al-
ready low as labor supply elasticities are higher.
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Stage 4 (retirement)
Full retirement (l = 1) occurs if the restriction n≥ 0 is binding in (40d), i.e. if 1−T ′−b1+τc w(τ)≤α
1/α1
0
or
h(τ)< α1/α10 (1+ τc)/
((
1−T ′−b)FN) (41)
4.2 Phase Diagram Analysis
The different stages in life cycle behavior that may apply to the household can be grouped to-
gether in a phase diagram. To handle the age-dependent character of productivity, we assume that
productivity remains constant until age T1, after which it drops to zero. This effectively implies
that the household retires at time T1. The analysis in Section 4.1 shows that for τ < T1, the flow
diagram is given by Figure 1.9 The retirement of the household at τ = T1 implies an endpoint
condition n(T1) = 0. To get there, n must jump at time τ = T1, because the job dynamics in (37a)
do not allow the origin to be reached in finite time. Jumping in n implies voluntary quits, so that
the job value must be zero just before the household retires. That is, the optimal trajectory in the
(n, pn) plane lands somewhere on the positive n-axis, to the left of the p˙n = 0 line in Figure 1.
To find the first part of the trajectory, it is sufficient to observe that the initial job value cannot be
above the p˙n = 0 line, as the resulting trajectory would violate the endpoint conditions. Hence the
job value must fall continuously. Labor participation increases during the first phase of the life
cycle, until the trajectory intersects the n˙ = 0 line. After that, the household continues to search,
but at a reduced intensity, until the trajectory intersects with the u = 0 line. This moment defines
the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in terms of Proposition 1. Both labor participation and
the job value continue to fall until the latter is zero. This moment marks the transition to Phase
3. During Phase 3, labor participation depends only on the net wage (see (40c)), and as long as
this remains constant participation is constant as well. By assumption, at time τ = T1 productivity
drops below the threshold, at which point the household quits its remaining jobs.
We summarize these findings in the following
Proposition 3 Let the period utility function be specified as in (27), and suppose that the produc-
tivity profile is constant till retirement and let the household enter the labor market at a zero level
of employment. Then the following successive stages may be distinguished 10
1a Labor participation increases, but job value falls. Job search is positive.
1b Job value and labor participation decrease. Job search is positive.
2 Job value and labor participation decrease. Job search is zero.
9It is assumed that piu = 0.
10The numbering of these stages corresponds to those in Proposition 1 and the numbering of the different parts of the
optimal trajectory in Figure 1.
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3 Job value is zero. The wage rate is equal to marginal productivity. Labor participation
depends only on the after-tax wage rate.
4 The households exits the labor market if its productivity drops below a threshold given in
(41).
5 Search Costs and Unemployment
5.1 Search Costs and Implicit Taxes
In the Mortensen-Pissarides model households do not succeed in obtaining a job costlessly, but
first have to invest in search time. This search cost creates a wedge, or implicit tax, between the
marginal utility of leisure and the wage rate. The size of this wedge is age-dependent, as elder
workers have a shorter horizon than young workers. In this section we investigate the size of the
wedge created by search costs in relation to the age of the worker. In general, such a measure
contains both an intratemporal substitution effect and an intertemporal substitution effect. As
workers prefer to search in periods where the current wage is low and the future wage is high, the
size of the total distortion depends partly on the expected time path of wages.
The measure that we apply here does not take into account intertemporal distortions. It com-
pares the marginal utility of leisure with the value that would obtain if the search costs in that
period were zero, provided that the income effects of this change are compensated.11 Suppose that
for a household in period t expected search time 1/χ suddenly and unexpectedly drops to zero for
the time interval (t, t + ε), after which it returns to its previous level. It follows from (18a) that the
job value is zero over this interval. Denote the volumes of consumption of goods and leisure of a
household of age τ that go with zero search costs by c¯(τ) and ¯l(τ), respectively.12 Then the search
arbitrage equation (16) simplifies to
υ
¯l(c¯(τ),
¯l(τ))
υc¯(c¯(τ), ¯l(τ))
=
w(τ) [1−T ′ (w(τ)n(τ))]− z(τ)+λn(τ)
1+ τc
, t < τ < t + ε (42)
Note that (42) defines the classical labor supply curve. The income effect of the change in search
costs is compensated, so that the marginal utility of wealth (λa) does not change. It follows from
(15b) that for compensated changes
υ(c¯(τ), ¯l(τ))−1/γυc¯(c¯(τ), ¯l(τ)) = υ(c(τ), l(τ))−1/γυc(c(τ), l(τ)) (43)
In the presence of search costs, the money value of leisure is given as before by (18a)
υl(c(τ), l(τ))
υc(c(τ), l(τ))
= (χ(τ)pn(τ)+piu +λu(τ))/(1+ τc)
11The compensation is negative, and approximately equal to the job value times the resulting change in the level of
employment.
12The analysis in this section is for a given generation. For notational convenience, we assume t0 = 0, so that the
generation index can be omitted.
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The net search costs equal the value of the leisure foregone, pu(τ)
.= υ
¯l/υc¯−υl/υc, so
pu(τ) =
(1−b−T ′(τ))w(τ)+λn(τ)− (χ(τ)pn(τ)+piu +λu(τ))
1+ τc
(44)
The search wedge is defined as Λu
.= pu/
(
υ
¯l/υc¯
)
, so
Λu(τ) = 1− χ(τ)pn(τ)+piu +λu(τ)(1−T ′(τ)−b)w(τ)+λn(τ) (45)
(45) summarizes the effect of search frictions on labor supply in terms of a wedge between
Walrasian and actual marginal utility of leisure. Search frictions push the return to job search,
χ pn+piu, below the after-tax market wage (1−T ′−b)w. The opportunity costs of leisure may be
even lower if the household does not engage in labor market search (λu > 0). On the other hand, it
follows from (16) and (18a) that for a household that is fully retired, λu+piu = (1−T ′−b)w+λn,
so that Λu = 0. Combining (44) and (45) yields a relation between search costs and wedges:
pu(τ) = (1−Λτ(τ))Λu(τ)w(τ) (46)
where Λτ = 1− 1−T ′1+τc + b1+τc denotes the combined effect of the tax wedge and the replacement rate
(for λn = 0). That is, after-tax search costs depend positively on the search wedge and negatively
on the tax wedge and the replacement rate.
An alternative characterization of search costs may be given by considering the holding cost
of a job. Using (16), (44) implies that net search costs are equal to
pu =
1
1+ τc
pn (r+ q¯+µ− p˙n /pn) (47)
This expression relates the net search costs to the implicit capital cost of holding a job. A higher
rate of interest implies that the required return to search time increases, so that search cost increase
as well. Higher separation rates or higher mortality rates affect the return to job search in a similar
fashion. Search costs are lower if the job value is expected to increase, e.g. due to expected wage
increases, or if consumption taxes are higher, as a result of lower opportunity costs of leisure.
To find the total size of distortions on the labor market, the marginal value of leisure should
be compared with the value of leisure in the absence of any leisure-consumption distortions. Let
l∗ and c∗ denote the undistorted choices of leisure and consumption, so that vl∗/vc∗ = w.13 The
total costs of leisure foregone are then vl∗/vc∗ − vl/vc, and we may define the labor market wedge
as Λl
.= 1−(vl/vc)/(vl∗/vc∗). The labor market wedge is related to the tax wedge and the search
wedge by
Λl = 1− (1−Λτ)(1−Λu) (48)
In a life cycle context, it is the total wedge that determines labor market participation. As will
appear from the simulation results in Section 6, the tax wedge is generally several times larger
than the search wedge. However, as will appear in the next section, the search wedge derives its
importance from its effect on search efforts
13Again, to maintain comparability, the removal of the distortion is accompanied by a compensating transfer.
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5.2 Unemployment
The theoretical analysis of Section 2.3.1 shows that search effort u(τ) goes to zero during the
later stages of the working life. The model therefore predicts that search unemployment of elder
workers is lower than that of young workers. Prima facie, this prediction is at variance with
empirical evidence about age-related unemployment rates. For workers below age sixty, observed
unemployment rises with age (Rein and Jacobs (1993)). On the other hand, the prediction of the
model is consistent with an observed increase in unemployment duration for elder workers.
The standard definition of unemployment is the extent to which people are available for work
at the current wage rate.14 This definition therefore compares the existing employment of a house-
hold with the amount of labor the household would want to supply if a job were offered to them,
i.e. in the absence of transactions costs. Interpreted this way, unemployment is a consequence
of a non-zero search wedge, as expounded in Section 5.1. We may quantify this concept of un-
employment by comparing the amount of leisure in states with and without transactions costs. To
neutralize the income effects of the change in transaction costs, we consider a compensated change
with constant marginal utility of money. This way we capture not only search unemployment in
our unemployment definition but the full size of the distortion generated by transaction costs. In
fact, the only difference between the concepts of “unemployment” and “search costs” is the unit
of measurement, labor time vs. money. This leads us to define unemployment as
Definition 1 Let τ denote the age of a household. The level of unemployment of the household is
defined as l(τ)− ¯l(τ), where ¯l(τ) denotes the amount of leisure defined in (42) and (43).
Note that, as defined, unemployment is entirely voluntary. Households rationally choose not to
invest in the search time necessary to increase their employment level. However, the definition
does connect with the old concept of “involuntary unemployment” in the sense that e.g. elder
workers with low participation rates would be willing to work more at the going wage rate. Indeed,
the analysis in Section 4.2 shows that the job value is still positive during the larger part of the
zero search stage of a household, implying that the reservation wage during that period is below
the market wage. It is in this sense that we can say that the level of unemployment is positive for
elder workers, even though they do not search for jobs.
6 Policy Simulations
To investigate the effect of social insurance benefits and taxes on labor market participation and
unemployment over the life cycle of a household in the general case we resort to numerical simu-
lation. To solve the model, we use a discrete-time version, that is described in Appendix A. The
14The standard OECD definition is that people are unemployed if they are available for work, and have taken steps
to obtain work in the last four weeks. The amount of effort invested in job search may be arbitrarily small, however,
and in any case a nominal search effort is required to be eligible for unemployment benefits.
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Table 1: Tax rates and replacement rates
% τk τn τc b
NL 24.7 41.0 18.7 51
US 31.3 22.6 6.1 14
Source τ : Carey et al. (2000, Table 4)
b : OECD (2002, Table 3.11).
calibration of the model is described in Appendix B. As a benchmark we use the tax rates and so-
cial insurance replacement rates of the Netherlands as they apply to a modal household. To assess
the impact of these rates on life cycle behavior of this household, we compare the outcomes with
those that would result if the same household were to face the tax and social insurance rates that
apply in the U.S. Both sets of rates are presented in Table 1. To separate the effects of changes in
the tax system from those of the replacement rate, we execute the transition in two steps, by first
changing the replacement rate and then the tax rates.
In addition, we look at the effect of the Dutch rates on low-productivity households with the
same preferences and life expectancy as the modal household. In the Netherlands, in contrast
to the U.S., the replacement rate is income-dependent and is substantially higher for low-income
households. As a result, the effect of the social insurance system on low-productivity households
is very different from that of high productivity households. We also looked at the effects of the
U.S. system on a low-productivity household. It appeared that for the U.S., productivity hardly
matters for labor participation, as the replacement rate is virtually the same, and the marginal value
of leisure is therefore proportional to the net wage rate.15
In the simulations, the budgetary effects of changes in the taxes and replacement rates are
balanced by means of lump-sum taxes and transfers to households. We also take into account the
effect of different values of the tax rates and replacement rates on the outcome of wage bargaining.
However, we keep the matching rates constant at the initial benchmark value. This way we are
able to see the impact of the social security system on life cycle labor supply without the effects
of shifts in equilibrium unemployment and vacancies on unemployment duration. These general
equilibrium effects change the return to search and thereby tend to obscure the primary effect of
taxes and replacement rates on life cycle behavior. At the same time, our neglect of the equilibrium
unemployment effects restricts the validity of the welfare effects of the social insurance changes
investigated.
We investigate the impact of reforms on the behavior of a young household, who can still adjust
her full lifecycle path of labor supply and consumption. Our simulation results do not therefore
cover the behavior of elder households, who face an unexpected change in social security. Together
with the assumed constancy of matching rates, this implies that the simulation results do not shed
15This feature of our model contrasts with the Mortensen-Pissarides (1999) model. The difference derives from the
specification of leisure in the utility function.
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light on the transition path following a reform.
6.1 Results
The curves labelled Base in Figures 3-4 represent the time allocation in the base case. Even
though the utility function is different, we observe that the household passes through the same four
successive stages that are described in Proposition 1. During the first stage, ranging till the age of
54 years, labor supply and search time are strictly positive. In the beginning of active working life,
search time is used to increase labor market participation. In the middle of the first stage search
effort is fairly constant, and mainly used to compensate for the (exogenous) destruction of jobs.
Towards the end of stage I, search time, and consequently labor supply, is reduced. Stage II lasts
from 55 to 60 years. During this stage workers no longer search for new jobs. This accelerates the
fall of labor participation. At the age of 61 workers start to quit voluntarily (stage III). At the age
of 63 they fully retire.
Figure 6 shows the ratio between marginal productivity and the gross wage as a function of
age. Firms are willing to pay a wage above marginal productivity for very young workers since
they expect that the productivity of these workers will increase rapidly. This creates a capital gain
effect in the worker value (see (8)).16 The job value rises gradually until age 53 (Figure 5). During
this phase, the match surplus is fairly constant as a percentage of marginal productivity, c.q. the
marginal value of leisure. This outcome is a consequence of the constancy of the search effort
during this phase (Figure 4). From age 53 onwards the job value starts to decline, to reach zero
at age 61. The slowdown in the growth of the job value initially implies that the gap between the
wage and marginal productivity widens.17 Intuitively, the anticipation of the decline of the job
value in the near future lowers the return to search and thereby worsens the bargaining position of
the worker.18 As the job value continues to fall, the match surplus gradually disappears and labor
market exit becomes a viable outside option. When the job value is zero and workers start exiting
(Phase III), the wage equals the marginal product (see Proposition 2).
As a first step in the assessment of the effects of taxes and unemployment benefits we look at
the size of the distortion by age. The total size of the labor market distortion depends on the labor
market wedge (48). However, the age-specific part of this wedge is given by the search wedge,
defined in (45), which is presented in Figure 7. This part of the wedge is negative for the first
two years, as a result of the capital gain effect (see also (47)). The search wedge is fairly constant
between 4% and 6% during the middle period of working life. This reflects the transaction costs
of the search imperfection, as implied by the transition rates on the labor market (see Appendix
16Similarly, young workers are prepared to accept a wage below their marginal value of leisure, also to capture the
capital gain associated with rising productivity.
17Note that this effect works in a direction opposite of implicit contract theory (Lazear (1979)).
18The fall-back consists of the unemployment benefits plus the opportunity costs of leisure. These costs fall if the
return to search falls.
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B). The search wedge then strongly increases around the age at which the job value is maximal,
because the imminent decline of the job value lowers the return to search. The increase in the
search wedge raises the labor market wedge by a few points and effectively stops job search.
Search frictions thus distort the labor supply of older workers to a much larger extent than that of
young workers.
The age-specific size of labor market distortions is also illustrated by the age profile of ‘vol-
untary’ unemployment in Figure 8 (see also Section 5.2). Unemployment is higher for young and
elderly workers. Whereas for young workers this mostly reflects a start-up cost, for old workers
the age pattern of unemployment reflects the low return to search. A comparison of Figures 4 and
8 clearly shows that the development of search unemployment fails to explain the observed pattern
of unemployment by age. A search unemployment-based measure of unemployment predicts that
unemployment gradually falls with rising age and is zero from about age 54. On the other hand,
the measure that we propose predicts that unemployment is maximal around age 55, and then
falls rapidly to zero as workers retire. This corresponds well with observed age-unemployment
patterns.
We now turn to the effects of the tax and social security system on labor supply. Table 1 and
Figure 2 show that the tax wedge as well as the replacement rate in the U.S. are much lower
than in the Netherlands. In a what-if scenario, labelled Low, we simulate the consequences of
implementing the US tax and benefit structure in an otherwise unchanged setting. The reform
is implemented in two steps, to show the effects of each measure in isolation. The reforms are
executed in a budgetary neutral fashion for the government and social insurance funds combined.
This way we hope to shed light both on the causes of differences in labor market participation
between the Netherlands (or the EC) and the U.S., and on the determinants of the shifts in labor
market participation of elder workers generally.
The welfare effects of the reform are substantial, with an equivalent variation of 14% of life-
time wealth.19 This reflects the reduction of the labor market wedge, both on account of the
reduction in the replacement rate and the reduction in consumption and labor taxes. The slight
increase in the capital income tax does not undo these positive effects. The reform has an ac-
companying (positive) lump-sum transfer of only 3% of lifetime wealth. This positive budgetary
effect results mainly from the broadening of the labor tax base. Of course, this positive welfare
effect springs at least partly from our neglect of a fundamental reason for the existence of social
insurance, risk aversion.20
As a consequence of the reform, the return to search triples, and participation increases at all
19In the case of labor market frictions part of the time endowment has to be spend on searching in every period. We
therefore define lifetime income as the maximum income that a person aged 19 can attain by combining working and
searching time (i.e., without leisure consumption).
20However, Costain (1997) and Engen and Gruber (2001) argue that public insurance programmes crowd out saving.
Self-insurance of households through precautionary saving may undo much of the positive effects of public insurance.
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ages. The effective retirement age moves up by four years (see Figures 3-4). The increase in the
return to search is primarily due to a decrease in the tax and replacement rate wedges. Figure 7
shows that the search wedge remains unaffected during most of the working life. However, the
increase in search returns shifts the peak of the search wedge to a higher age. This shows that the
age-related increase in labor market distortions shifts to higher ages as well. For most age groups,
unemployment is virtually the same after the reform, but the age-dependent peak shifts to higher
ages (Figure 8). After the reform, unemployed workers in the age group 59-63 do not exit from
the labor force (even though they have stopped searching). Wage formation is also affected by
the reform. The increase in job value implies that the return to search and the marginal value of
leisure increase. Even so, the fall-back of the worker deteriorates, because the replacement rate is
much lower. This implies that the gross wage falls, relative to marginal productivity (Figure 6).21
In two additional simulations we decompose the total effect of the reform into a replacement
rate effect and a tax effect.22 In the first scenario, RRlow, only the replacement rate is reduced,
while the tax rates are unchanged from the base case. In the second scenario, Tlow, tax rates are set
at US levels. It appears from Figure 3 that in terms of the effects on labor supply, both measures
contribute about equally to the increase in participation rates, though lowering the replacement
rate has a slightly larger effect. The effect of both reforms on wages is different, however. Figure
6 shows that the lowering of the replacement rate is responsible for the larger part of the fall in
gross wages. This neutrality of tax rates with respect to wage bargaining is a standard result from
the literature (see e.g. Pissarides (1998)). However, we observe that here the tax rate does have an
effect on wages for workers who have stopped searching. For these workers, the marginal value
of leisure is no longer proportional to the return to search. As a result, a decrease in tax rates does
not improve their fall-back position to the same degree as their return from work, so that the gross
wage declines.23
A final analysis demonstrates that the outcomes are sensitive to the worker type. Instead of
the average worker from the base case, we now consider a low productivity worker (a worker
at 12% from the bottom of the productivity distribution). This worker has a productivity that is
73% lower on average than our modal worker. Because of minimum-wage related floors for social
assistance rates, the replacement rate for this low-productivity worker rises to about 80% of his
market wage.24 Figure 9 is in line with observed labor market behavior: low productivity workers
supply less labor and retire early. The implicit search tax in Figure 10 attains a similar maximal
level but at a much lower age, relative to the average worker.
21This is not a full equilibrium, because we neglect the effect of the fall in the gross wage on the creation of vacancies
(see equation (9)). With more vacancies, unemployment duration falls, which improves the bargaining position of
employees. This provides a counterforce to the decline of the replacement rate.
22Both measures are implemented in a balanced-budget framework, by means of lump sum taxes.
23The effect is somewhat obscured by the simultaneous increase in the period over which workes continue to search.
This means that the search wedge starts to affect the wage outcome a few years later.
24Note also that the basic public pensions are independent of labor incomes.
22
A transition to the US tax and benefit system (in particular the reduction of the replacement
rate from 80% to 14% 25) affects the low-productivity worker more strongly than a model worker.
After the policy reform, his labor supply becomes similar to that of the average worker. The
welfare effect is also much stronger, with an equivalent variation of 44% of lifetime wealth.
7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the age-dependency of participation and unemployment by integrating
job search with intertemporal optimizing behavior of finitely-lived households. We show that labor
supply can be classified into four consecutive stages: active job search; employed without active
searching; voluntary quitting and full retirement. The representative agent case only considers the
first stage, in which the return to job search equals the marginal value of leisure. However, for
older workers this equality no longer holds, because the non-negativity constraint on search time
becomes binding. As a result, search frictions and tax rates distort labor market decisions of older
workers to a much larger extent than those of young workers.
Extending the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model with finite lives provides an explanation
for several age-specific features of the labor market. First, the observed fall in participation rates
of the elderly follows the decline in the return to search, caused by the approaching retirement.
We point out that, in a life-cycle perspective, labor taxes and social insurance create a dynamic
distortion, by affecting the return to search. We find that this distortion increases with age. This
result provides an explanation of the observed fall of participation rates and retirement ages of
elder workers as a result of the post-war increase of tax rates and replacement rates.
Second, higher search costs imply higher ‘voluntary’ unemployment. Voluntary unemploy-
ment is defined here as the extra amount that a household would be willing to work at the going
wage rate if transaction costs were absent. The finding that unemployment is maximal a few years
before the retirement age corresponds well with observations.
Third, the negotiated wage differs by age as the match surplus is age-specific. The (nega-
tive) gap between the wage and the marginal productivity rises with the search wedge, as this
deteriorates the worker’s fall-back position. For workers close to retirement, wages equal their
productivity.
In view of the strong increase in the ageing costs, policies that stimulate labor participation of
older workers are widely advocated. Our analysis indicates that older workers suffer from high
implicit search taxes. Measures that decrease the replacement rates of the alternative exit routes
are best suited for targeting these age-specific distortions.
The analysis is subject to three main limitations. First, the analysis is partial by leaving out
effects on the equilibrium labor market flow rates. A general equilibrium analysis has to take into
account changes in the distribution of the workers over ages as well as over types. Firms will post
25The replacement rate in the US is mostly independent of income.
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fewer vacancies if the proportion of job seekers with low job values rises. Second, the analysis
is non-stochastic. Households self-insure against the unemployment risk by holding many small
jobs. Thus there is no income risk and no precautionary saving. This limits the use of the model for
welfare analysis. Examples of stochastic studies include Costain (1997) and Heer (1997). Third,
the unemployment benefits are independent of the labor history as well as of the unemployment
duration. In reality, the replacement rate falls strongly with the unemployment spell, at least for
higher incomes (see OECD, 2002, Table 3.11). This implies that the model overstates the negative
effects of unemployment insurance on labor market participation for higher incomes.
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Appendix
A The model in discrete time
For simulation purposes the model of section 2 is transferred to discrete time. Lifetime utility (14)
is now written as26:
ϒ = 1
1−1/γ
T
∑
τ=1
Λ(τ)
(1+ρ)τ−1
υ (c(τ), l(τ))1−1/γ (A.1a)
υ(τ) =
[
θ 1/σc(τ)1−1/σ +(1−θ)1/σ (θl(τ)l(τ))1−1/σ
]σ/(σ−1)
(A.1b)
where σ denotes the intratemporal substitution elasticity and Λ(τ) the survival probability. The
budget constraint (12) is adjusted in the following ways. Assets receive an extra return µ(τ),
arising from the actuarially fair annuity. Proportional taxes are levied on capital income, labor
income and consumption at the constant rates τk, τn and τc, respectively (i.e. T ′ = τn). Age-
specific transfers y(τ) are added, in the form of public pensions paid from the age of 65 years
(independent of the labor history). Unemployment benefits are a fraction of the individual net
wage rate (i.e. piu = 0). The budget constraint (12) reduces to:
(1−µ(τ))a(τ+1) = (1+ r(1− τk))a(τ)+(1− τn)w(τ)n(τ)+
b(τ)(1− τn)w(τ)(1−n(τ))+ y(τ)− (1+ τc)c(τ) (A.2)
The job accumulation equation (11) is:
n(τ) = χu(τ)+(1−q(τ))n(τ−1) (A.3)
with n(0) = 0. Since the average unemployment duration (1/χ) is less than one year, it is assumed
that a person can find a job the same period that it searches. Finally, the restrictions on the time
allocations must hold.
In the individual optimization problem the wage rate is exogenous. However, eq. (24) shows
that the wage rate depends on the optimal decisions. Solving the model therefore requires finding
the fixed point of (A.4), in which the marginal utilities are evaluated in the optimum27:
w(τ) =
1
1− (1−ω)b(τ)
[
ωFN(τ)h(τ)+(1−ω)
(1+ τc)υl(τ)
(1− τn)υc(τ)
]
(A.4)
When the person does not supply labor (n = 0), the wage rate is not negotiated but set equal to
productivity FNh. In these cases, the wage only matters for the calculation of the unemployment
benefits.
26The generation index t0 is dropped in this section.
27In this section we are only interested in solutions of the individual optimisation problem. The analysis remains
partial in the sense that the effect of the aggregate labor supply on marginal productivity FN is neglected. For the same
reasons, balance on the government budget is not imposed.
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B Calibration
The simulations consider the adult life of a worker of modal productivity. Coefficient values
are taken from the general equilibrium model IMAGE, calibrated for the Netherlands (see Broer,
1999). Parameters in the utility function are ρ = 0.02 (rate of time preference), γ = 0.25 (in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution), θ = 0.71 (consumption weight in utility flow), and σ = 0.73
(intratemporal elasticity of substitution). For θl , an exponential function is calibrated to match the
observed participation rates, yielding θl(τ) = 1165.66exp(−0.13τ). The hump-shaped produc-
tivity index h is calibrated from the observed wage profile. It starts at 0.4 at the age of 19 years;
peaks at 1.5 at the age of 61 years and then starts to fall. The mortality rates are calculated from
the mid-range demographic projection for the 1999 generation of Statistics Netherlands. The real
interest rate is set at 5%.
Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) provide average effective tax rates over the period 1991-
97, using a modified version of the Mendoza et al. (1994) methodology. The average gross
replacement rate for 1999 is taken from OECD (2002).28 This rate b is set at 0% for persons older
than 65 years. Tax rates and the replacement rate for the benchmark case are given in column NL
in Table 1. Figure 2 gives the discrete counterpart of the tax wedge defined in (46). It shows that
the wedge in the Netherlands is one of the largest in the OECD. We include only public pension
transfer in pension income.
Regarding the labor market parameters, the matching rate χ is assumed to be 2, implying
an average unemployment duration (1/χ) of half a year. The minimum separation rate q is set
at 10% (In the Mortensen-Pissarides setting, these values would imply an unemployment rate of
q/(q+χ) = 4.8% in the steady state). Productivity FN(1) is chosen to replicate the average wage
rate in the base year. It is assumed to grow at the rate of technical progress of 2%. Finally, the
bargaining power of the worker ω equals 0.5.
Table 2: Labor supply elasticities of a modal worker
age productivity income replacement rate tax wedge
20 0.017 -0.217 -0.097 -0.273
30 0.021 -0.173 -0.073 -0.214
40 0.062 -0.247 -0.103 -0.308
50 0.202 -0.468 -0.196 -0.611
60 0.000 -1.134 -0.460 -0.558
Notes: The shocks simulated to calculate the elasticities are
productivity: increase of the productivity profile by 5%
income: lump-sum transfer of 5% of remaining lifetime income
replacement rate: see scenario Rlow (including compensating lump-sum transfers)
tax wedge: see scenario Tlow (including compensating lump-sum transfers)
Table 2 presents a number of labor supply elasticities of the calibrated model. The (uncom-
pensated) productivity elasticity of labor supply is around zero for young workers, but increases
substantially for middle-aged workers. The elasticity drops to zero for workers who are no longer
28This summary measure is calculated as the unweighted average of 18 gross unemployment benefit replacement
rates for three household types, three durations and two earnings levels.
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actively engaged in job search.29 The average supply elasticity is consistent with the econometric
evidence of reduced-form labor supply equations (see Pencavel (1986)). The income effect of
labor supply is about -0.3, which is in the middle of the estimates surveyed by Pencavel. It too
increases with age.30 The effect of the replacement rate on labor supply is rather close to the es-
timates presented by Broer et al. (2000), whereas the elasticities of the tax wedge are a bit larger,
but still in the same order of magnitude.
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Based on the complementary slackness conditions, 24 = 16 different multiplier combinations
may be distinguished. Most of these combinations may be excluded beforehand. First, λl > 0 may
be excluded on the argument that this would result in an unbounded marginal utility of leisure
for γ < ∞. Second, the complementary slackness condition (18c) implies that if q(t)> q¯(t), then
λq(t) = 0. Suppose λq(t) = 0, then from (18b), pn(t) = 0 as well. This says that if a household is
voluntarily quitting jobs,31 the marginal asset value of a job must be zero. If a household chooses to
do this over an interval [t1, t2], then for t ∈ (t1, t2), p˙n = 0. It follows from (16) that for t ∈ (t1, t2)
and n(t) > 0, (1+ τc)
υl
υc = w(t) [1−b−T ′] and (18a) then leads to λu(t) = w(t)(1−b−T ′)−
piu (t). Hence, as long as the effective unemployment replacement rate piu/w(1−b−T ′) is below
unity, λq(t) = 0∧λn(t) = 0 ⇒ λu(t)> 0 for t ∈ (t1, t2).32 If on the other hand λn(t)> 0, n(t) = 0
and from (18b) λq(t) = 0. Therefore we can also disregard all cases with λn(t) > 0∧λq(t) > 0
(with zero jobs, quitting carries no costs).
The number of multipliers combinations may therefore be reduced to four, Case 1 (λu =
0, λq > 0, λn = 0 and u > 0, q = q¯, n > 0), Case 2 (λu > 0, λq > 0, λn = 0 and u = 0, q = q¯, n > 0),
Case 3 (λu > 0, λq = 0, λn = 0 and u = 0, q > q¯, n > 0), and Case 4 (λu > 0, λq = 0, λn > 0 and
u = 0, q ≥ q¯, n = 0).33 
References
Atkinson, A.B. (1999), The Economic Consequences of Rolling back the Welfare State, MIT
Press.
Bhattacharya, J., C.B. Mulligan, and R.R. Reed (2001), “Labor Market Search and Optimal
Retirement Policy,” NBER Working Paper 8591.
29The elasticity has been computed as the effect of a 5% permanent increase in productivity, starting from the relevant
age. Conceptually, this productivity elasticity comes closest to a wage elasticity of labor supply. Note that a sufficiently
large increase in productivity would create an incentive for these workers to resume job search. On the other hand, a
sufficiently large fall in productivity induces quitting.
30The remarks in Footnote 29 also apply to income effects. Small income changes do not affect labor supply of non-
searching households. However, a (large) increase of 5% of remaining lifetime income reduces the job value sufficiently
to induce voluntary quits.
31
“Quitting” in this context may also be interpreted as a reduction in working time.
32That is, a household is not involuntarily unemployed at the same time that it is quitting. However, in the ex-
treme case that the replacement rate is above unity, the household continues to search while quitting, to collect the
unemployment benefit.
33with λl = 0 in all four cases.
27
Blau, D.M. (1994), “Labor Force Dynamics of Older Men,” Econometrica, 62, 117-156.
Blundell, R. and T. MaCurdy (1999), “Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches,”
Chapter 27 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume
3A, Elsevier.
Blundell, R., C. Meghir, and P. Neves, (1993), “Labour Supply and Intertemporal Substitution,”
Journal of Econometrics, 59, 137-160.
Bound, J. and R.V. Burkhauser (1999), “Economic Analysis of Transfer Programs Targeted on
People with Disabilities,” Chapter 51 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of
Labor Economics, Volume 3C, Elsevier.
Broer, D.P. (1999), “Growth and Welfare Distribution in an Ageing Society: an Applied General
Equilibrium Analysis for the Netherlands,” OCFEB Research Memorandum 9908, Erasmus
University (downloadable from http://www.few.eur.nl/few/research/pubs/ocfeb/documents/rm9908.pdf).
Broer, D.P., D.A.G. Draper and F.H. Huizinga (2000), “The Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment
in the Netherlands,” De Economist, 148, 345-371.
Browning, M., L.P. Hansen and J.J. Heckman (1999), “Micro Data and General Equilibrium
Models,” Chapter 8 in J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics,
North-Holland.
Card, D. (1994), “Intertemporal Labor Supply,” in C.A. Sims (ed.), Advances in Econometrics:
Sixth World Congress, Volume II, Cambridge.
Carey, D. and H. Tchilinguirian (2000), “Average effective tax rates on capital, labour and con-
sumption,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 258.
Costain, J.S. (1997), ”Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Intensity and Precau-
tionary Saving,” Economics Working Papers 243, Department of Economics and Business,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Engen, E.M. and J. Gruber (2001), “Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 47, 545-579.
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (1997), “Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World,”
NBER Working Paper 6134.
Haveman, R.H. and B.L. Wolfe (1984), Disability Transfers and Early Retirement: A Causal
Relationship,” Journal of Public Economics, 31, 131-161.
Heer, B. (1997), “Unemployment Insurance versus Welfare Payments: a Dynamic CGE Analysis
of Employment and Welfare Effects,” Public Finance, 52, 367-393.
Kapteyn, A. and K. de Vos (1998), “Social Security and Labor-Force Participation in the Nether-
lands,” American Economic Review, 88, May, 164-67.
Lazear, E. (1979), “Why is There Mandatory Retirement?” Journal of Political Economy, 87,
1261-1284.
28
Lumsdaine, R.L. and O.S. Mitchell (1999), “New Developments in the Economic Analysis of Re-
tirement,” Chapter 49 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics,
Volume 3C, Elsevier.
Mankiw, N.G., J.J. Rotemberg, and L.H. Summers (1985), “Intertemporal Substitution in Macroe-
conomics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 225-251.
Mendoza, E.G.; A. Razin and L.L. Tesar (1994), “Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics:
Cross-Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and Consumption,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 34(3), 297-323.
Merz, M. (1995), “Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 36, 269-300.
Mortensen, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides (1999a), “New Developments in Models of Search in the
Labor Market,” Chapter 39 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, Volume 3B, Elsevier.
Mortensen, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides, (1999b), “Unemployment Responses to ’Skill-Biased’
Technology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy,” Economic Journal, 109, 242-265.
Mulligan, C.B. (1998), “Substitution over Time: Another Look at Life Cycle Labor Supply,”
NBER Working Paper No. 6585.
OECD (2002), Benefits and Wages, Paris.
Pencavel, J. (1986), “Labor Supply of Men: a Survey,” in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.),
Handbook of Labor Economics, 3-102.
Pissarides, C.A. (1990), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Blackwell.
Pissarides, C.A. (1998), “The Impact of Employment tax Cuts on Unemployment and Wages;
The Role of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure,” European Economic Review, 42,
155-183.
Rein, M. and K. Jacobs (1993), “Ageing and Employment Trends: a Comparative Analysis for
OECD Countries,” Chapter 3 in P. Johnson and K.F. Zimmerman (eds.), Labour Markets in
an Ageing Europe, Cambridge.
Shi, S. and Q. Wen (1997), “Labor Market Search and Capital Accumulation: Some Analytical
Results,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21, 1747-1776.
Shi, S. and Q. Wen, (1999), “Labor market search and the dynamic effects of taxes and subsidies,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, 457-495.
Shimer, R. and L. Smith (2001), “Matching, Search, and Heterogeneity,” Advances in Macroe-
conomics, 1, number 5.
Weiss, Y. (1986), “The Determinants of Life Cycle Earnings: A Survey,” Chapter 11 in O.Ashenfelter
and R. Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. I, North-Holland
Yaari, M.E. (1965), “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 32, 137-150.
29
n
•
= 0
p
n
•
= 0
pn
n
u = 0
Ia
Ib
II
IIIIV
Figure 1: Labor supply and job value over the life cycle
Figure 2: Tax wedge in the OECD
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Figure 5: Job value
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Figure 7: Search wedge
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Figure 8: Voluntary unemployment
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Figure 9: Labor supply of low productivity worker
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Figure 10: Search wedge of low productivity worker
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